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Public Access to Physician and Attorney Disciplinary
Proceedings
By Michael Spake
"KNOWLEDGE WILL FOREVER GOVERN IGNORANCE: AND A PEOPLE WHO
MEAN TO BE THEIR OWN GOVERNORS, MUST ARM THEMSELVES WITH THE
POWER WHICH KNOWLEDGE GIVES." - JAMES MADISON'
INTRODUCTION
Unlike criminal and civil trials, there is no presumptive right of access
under the First Amendment to attorney and physician disciplinary pro-
ceedings.2 In spite of this, public access is not always denied. Several
State Attorney Bars and State Boards of Medicine have procedures
which permit public and press access to disciplinary hearings. 3 These
procedures along with state open meeting statutes have resulted in a
statutory right of access. Additionally, twenty-five states have explicit
"open court" state constitutional provisions requiring public access to
disciplinary proceedings.
4
1. Letter from James Madison, to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), at http://www.jmu.edu/
madison/madison.htm (last visited March 4, 2002).
2. The sources of presumptive rights of access to court and administrative proceedings
are: (1) the First Amendment; (2) the common law; and (3) legislative enactments. These
rights are not absolute.
3. See Hayes, infra note 35, at 1119; Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia, 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) [hereinafter Press I1].
4. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; IND. CONST. art. I, §
12; Ky. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; MONT. CONST. art II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.D.
CONST art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEx. CONST. art.
I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 8. See
also Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705,
714 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that a State Bar Rule closing attorney disciplinary proceedings
was unconstitutional) [hereinafter Daily Gazette 1]; Dailey Gazette Co. v. W. Va. Bd. of
Med., 352 S.E.2d 66, 72 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that part of the West Virginia Medical Prac-
tice Act which closed physician disciplinary proceedings was unconstitutional) [hereinafter
Daily Gazette II].
290 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
Since Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,5 the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment guarantees that
criminal trials are public events. 6 Accordingly, the First Amendment
right of access has become firmly established by a line of recent Su-
preme Court decisions enforcing the right of the public and press to at-
tend criminal proceedings.7 Since Richmond Newspapers, courts have
extended the right of access to civil trials. 8 However, the right of the
public to attend civil trials under the First Amendment is subject to ex-
ceptions. 9
Contrary to criminal and civil proceedings, courts have held that there
is no presumptive right of access to administrative and disciplinary pro-
ceedings. However, courts have varied in their decisions permitting a
Constitutional right of access of the press to administrative hearings un-
der the First Amendment. Regarding attorney and physician disciplinary
hearings, courts have found no First Amendment right of access.
In order to shed light on access to disciplinary hearings, this paper
will analyze the current state of the law concerning the public's and
press' right of access to physician and attorney disciplinary proceedings.
Part I describes the history of public access and discusses public access
under the First Amendment. Part II describes the right of access to
criminal and civil trials since Richmond Newspapers. Part III examines
public access to administrative hearings. Part IV analyzes and discusses
5. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
6. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 610-
11(1982).
7. See generally Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing a qualified constitutional right of public to attend pretrial suppression hearing);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that an order exclud-
ing public and press from criminal trial in its entirety violates the First Amendment); Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596 (holding that statutory per se exclusion of public and press
from trial testimony of minors who are complaining witnesses in sex crime cases is unconsti-
tutional); Press II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (stating that access right extends to preliminary pro-
ceedings in criminal cases).
8. See Hayes, infra note 35, at 1117.
9. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273, 1277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding trade secrets to be a legitimate interest allowing for exclusion of
the public from testimony at trial); Mayer v. State, 523 So. 2d 1171, 1175-76 (Fl. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (upholding state statute closing hearings involving unwed mothers, custody, sex-
ual abuse, or permanent placement of children as constitutional); In re Adoption of H.Y.T.,
458 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29 (F]. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding the validity of a state statute
mandating the closure of proceedings in adoption as constitutional); State ex rel. Great Falls
Tribune Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, Cascade County, 777 P.2d 345, 350-51
(Mont. 1989) (upholding closure of trial in order to protect the physical safety of a trial par-
ticipant).
public access to attorney and physician disciplinary proceedings.
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE
Public Access
Public attendance at judicial proceedings is embedded throughout the
traditions of Anglo-American law.10 Prior to the Norman Conquest, the
freeman of the community in England attended trials. 1 Like a jury, at-
tendance was compulsory for the freeman, because they ultimately ren-
dered judgment. 12 Statutes were later created exempting mandatory at-
tendance. 13  The right of public access, however, was never
compromised as it evolved from the Magna Carta. 14 This feature even-
tually became "one of the most conspicuous features of English justice,
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the public have
free access." 15
The American Colonial Courts adopted the practice of allowing pub-
lic access. 16 In fact, records from colonial Virginia indicate that trials
were open. 17 Other colonies also adopted public access to judicial pro-
ceedings. 18 Referring to the Magna Carta anid Coke's Institutes, public
access was recognized in New Jersey, 19 Pennsylvania, 20 Massachu-
setts, 21 North Carolina,22 and Vermont.23 Additionally, the Continental
10. See generally Richmond Newspaper, 448 U.S. at 564-69 (illustrating that through-
out its evolution, the criminal trial was open to all who wanted to attend).
11. Id. at 565.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 566.
15. Id. at 566-67 (quoting EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed.
1967)).
16. Id. at 567.
17. Id. (noting that "nothing to the contrary has been cited").
18. Id. at 567-68.
19. CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (March 13, 1677), reprinted
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 184-88 (Richard Perry ed., 1959); see also Richmond News-
paper, 448 U.S. at 567 (quoting the open court provision of the CONCESSIONS AND AGREE-
MENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (March 13, 1677)).
20. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (April 25, 1682), reprinted in SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES 209-21, 217 (Richard Perry ed., 1959). See also Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 568 (quoting the FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (April 25, 1682).
21. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (December 10, 1641), reprinted in SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES, 148-61 (Richard Perry ed., 1959).
22. CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, & C. (December
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Congress recognized public access to judicial proceedings. 24 This pub-
lic access movement continued into the Northwest Territories when
Ohio and Indiana adopted the idea of public access into their respective
state constitutions. 2
5
The legal and political theory behind open courts was that access pro-
vided citizens assurance of the fairness of proceedings. 26 Thus, public
access became a bulwark of free and democratic government by provid-
ing a system of checks and balances involving public opinion, which ul-
timately restrained judicial power. 27 Second, access discouraged per-
jury, misconduct and bias.28  Jeremy Bentham recognized these
observations of Hale and Blackstone in writing:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in
comparison of publicity all checks are of small account.
Recordation, appeal, whatever other institution might
present themselves in the character of checks, would be
found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks
in reality, as checks only in appearance.
29
First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 30 As a result,
the First Amendment protects against the arbitrary exercise of power by
federal and state governments restricting free speech. A strict interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment would limit its applicability to means of
14, 1776), reprinted at SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 355-57 (Richard Perry ed., 1959).
23. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567-68 (citing CONCESSIONS AND AGREE-
MENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (March 13, 1677), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
184-88 (Richard Perry ed., 1959); FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (April 25,
1682), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 209-21 (Richard Perry ed., 1959); MASSA-
CHUSETS BODY OF LIBERTIES (December 10, 1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES, 148-61 (Richard Perry ed., 1959); CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, A DECLARA-
TION OF RIGHTS, & C. (December 14, 1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 355-57
(Richard Perry ed., 1959); and CONSTITUTION OF VERMONT, CH. 1, A DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT (July 8, 1777), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 364-367 (Richard Perry ed., 1959)).
24. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 568.
25. See IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
26. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (stating that openness "gave assurance
that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned..
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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expression. However, constitutional rights must be given their fullest
effect.3 1 Under this framework, the First Amendment acknowledges and
protects public access.
Although the First Amendment guarantees the freedom of public ac-
cess and press, and although the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a
trial is a public event,32 the First Amendment does not guarantee access
to all types of proceedings.33 The Supreme Court recognizes limitations
regarding First Amendment rights to public access. One such limitation
is that "the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our
[Supreme Court's] own conferences, the meetings of other official bod-
ies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private organiza-
tions." 34
CURRENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
In deciding whether a First Amendment right of access extends to a
particular proceeding, the Supreme Court relies upon a two-prong test.35
First, the Court determines whether the proceeding has been historically
open to the public.36 Specifically, the Court examines whether there has
been a historical presumption of access. 37 Second, the Court evaluates
whether access to the proceedings sought would contribute to the self-
governing function and further the democratic process.38 Thus, the test
formulates a right of access that is qualified, not absolute, by permitting
closure "by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is es-
31. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("For the First Amendment does
not speak equivocally .... It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit
language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.").
32. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683-85 (1972).
34. Id. at 684.
35. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 25:1-7 (3d
ed. 1996); see also Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 269 (1995); G. Michael Fen-
ner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Be-
yond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 415, 428 (1981) (explaining that two considerations de-
fine the scope: current and historical practice and public policy, the most important policy
being self-government); Michael J. Hayes, What Ever Happened to 'The Right To Know'?:
Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV.
1111, 1130-36 (1987) (tracing the development of the Supreme Court two-prong test and
then criticizing it).
36. Hayes, supra note 35, at 1117.
37. Id. at 1116.
38. Id. at 1117.
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sential to preserve higher values." 39 Notwithstanding the requirement of
an "overriding" interest, the Court states that to support an order exclud-
ing the public and press, reasonable alternatives to closure must be ex-
hausted. 40 Additionally, the trial court must make specific findings in
order to demonstrate the need for closure.
4 1
Richmond Newspapers and Criminal Proceedings
The Supreme Court first formulated a test to decide a First Amend-
ment right of public access in Richmond Newspapers. This case evolved
from multiple mistrials during a murder trial.42 At the commencement
of the fourth trial, the defendant moved that the public and press be ex-
cluded from the courtroom.43 Upon hearing no objections, the judge,
relying on Virginia Code § 19.2-266, closed the trial.4 4 The trial judge
exclaimed "having people in the courtroom is distracting to the jury."45
Additionally, "[Counsel for Defendant] referred to 'difficulty with in-
formation between jurors,' and stated that he 'didn't want information to
leak out,' [and] be published by the media, perhaps inaccurately, and
then be seen by the jurors." 46
The plurality opinion noted that the trial judge did not make any find-
ings to support closure, did not inquire into alternative solutions, and
failed to recognize any constitutional rights. 47 Seven members of the
Court agreed that there was a First Amendment right to attend criminal
trials. However, six Justices submitted separate opinions.
48
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens, acknowl-
edged that in order for the First Amendment to fulfill its core purpose of
39. Press 11, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501, 510 (1984) [hereinafter Press f]).
40. Press 1, 464 U.S. at 512-13.
41. Id.
42. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980).
43. Id.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Mitchie 2000) (providing in part: "In the trial of all
criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a
fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.").
45. Richmond Newspaper, 448 U.S. at 561.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring), 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring), 584-98
(Brennan, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Marshall), 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring),
601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
providing information related to "the functioning of government," some
right of access protection is needed.49 Noting that such a right of access
was not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights,
Chief Justice Burger stated:
The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of
the long history of trials being presumptively open. Pub-
lic access to trials was then regarded as an important as-
pect of the process itself ... In guaranteeing freedoms
such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend
trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guaran-
tees ... Free speech carries with it some freedom to lis-
ten... What this means in the context of trials is that the
First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, stand-
ing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public
at the time that Amendment was adopted."50
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
interpreted the First Amendment right of access differently. Justice
Brennan argued that the general character of the Constitution gives
meaning to the First Amendment.5 1 As a result, the "First Amendment
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communica-
tive interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in se-
curing and fostering our republican system of self-government." 52
Brennan conceded that the "the stretch of this protection is theoreti-
cally endless," 53 but warned that it "must be invoked with discrimination
and temperance." 54 Justice Brennan offered two "helpful principles" to
aid in establishing limits to access rights.55 First, "a right of access has
special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public
entree to [a] particular proceeding." 56 Thus, a tradition of openness to a
particular proceeding creates a stronger right of access. Second, the
49. Id. at 575-77.
50. Id. at 575-76.
51. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting William J. Brennan, Address at the Dedica-
tion of the Samuel I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice in Newark, N.J., in 32 RUTGERS
L. REv. 173, 177 (1979)).
54. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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value of access must be measured specifically by the public importance
to the trial process itself.57 Thus, access should be granted whenever it
furthers the function or purposes of the particular process involved.
After the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, the standard of
review to determine whether the constitutionally protected right of pub-
lic access had been violated remained unclear. The Court clarified the
standard of review a year later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court for Norfolk County.58
Globe Newspaper overturned a Massachusetts statutory per se exclu-
sion of public and press from the trial testimony of minors who are
complaining witnesses in sex crime cases.59 This occurred when report-
ers from the Boston Globe were excluded from several preliminary pro-
ceedings and petitioned the trial court to open all future proceedings to
the public and press. 60 The trial court denied the motion and closed all
proceedings involving a man accused of committing forcible rape
against minors. 61 The court relied on section 16A of Chapter 278 of the
Massachusetts General Laws, which on its face provided for mandatory
closure of such trials. 62 Using the two-prong test from Richmond News-
papers, the Globe Newspaper Court reaffirmed that the right of access
applied to all criminal trials, thereby ruling that section 16A of Chapter
278 Massachusetts General Laws was unconstitutional.
63
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press I") 6' used the same
test to determine a public right of access to voir dire proceedings. 65
Prior to voir dire proceedings involving the trial for the rape and murder
of a teenage girl, Press-Enterprise Company filed a motion seeking ac-
57. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
59. Id. at 598. Relying on MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981), the
Court stated:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person
upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, . . . the
presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the court room, admitting
only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
Id.
60. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598-99.
61. Id. at 599.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 610-11.
64. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
65. Id. at513.
cess to the proceedings. 66 Claiming that public access could inhibit the
candor of the jurors and jeopardize the defendant's fair trial rights, the
state opposed the motion.67 The trial court permitted access to the pro-
ceeding, but excluded the press and public from the special death pen-
alty voir dire.68 Press-Enterprise applied for release of the transcript,
but after the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, the trial
court denied the motion for access.69 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court
held that voir dire proceedings are presumptively open and that this pre-
sumption can "be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest."
70
Press I marked the first instance in which the Supreme Court exam-
ined public access outside the realm of criminal trials:71 "the process of
jury selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversar-
ies but to the criminal justice system." 72
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press I1") 73 applied the stan-
dard to preliminary hearings and affirmed the definitive standard for
determining whether a right of access exists. 74 Press II concerned the
exclusion of the press and public from a preliminary hearing that was
conducted to determine whether the defendant must answer a criminal
complaint charging him with twelve counts of murder.7
5
Applying precedent, the Supreme Court ruled that a qualified right of
access exists if: (1) there is a tradition of access to the proceeding and
(2) access plays a "significant positive role in the functioning of the par-
ticular process in question. '"76 The Court emphasized that when there is
a "qualified" right of access, the reviewing court must decide whether
the government can restrict that right.77 Restriction of a qualified right
of access is determined by the strict scrutiny test applied in Globe News-
paper and Press I: the right of access can only be restricted if it is out-
66. Id. at 503.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 504.
70. Id. at 510.
71. Hayes, supra note 35, at 1119.
72. Press!, 464 U.S. at 505.
73. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 7. This two-factor test became known as the "tests of experience." Id. at 9.
77. Id.
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weighed by an "overriding" government interest and if the denial of ac-
cess is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.78
The only issue unresolved by the Supreme Court after Press II was
whether the right of access and the standard that defines it could be ex-
tended outside the context of criminal proceedings. However, since
Richmond Newspaper, courts have articulated that a constitutional right
of access is applicable to civil, as well as to criminal trials.79
Civil Trials
The California Supreme Court recently applied Brennan's "tests of
experience and logic" to civil trials.80 In KNBC-TV, the California Su-
preme Court became the first state Supreme Court to rule that the First
Amendment provides a right of access to ordinary civil trials and pro-
ceedings. 81
In a civil action involving prominent entertainment figures, the Cali-
fornia Superior Court sustained a motion which excluded the public and
press from all proceedings that did not occur in the presence of a jury. 82
After several closed proceedings, KNBC-TV, a NBC subsidiary, ob-
tained a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeals vacating
the trial court's closure order on the ground that the findings of the trial
court did not support such blanket exclusions. 83 The California Su-
preme Court upheld the writ.84
78. Id. at 9 (quoting Press 1, 464 U.S. at 510).
79. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 24 (2d Cir.
1984) (stating that the public and press have a First Amendment right to attend, but not to
televise, a civil trial); see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings
concerning a motion for preliminary injunction in securities litigation; closure is not war-
ranted merely to protect disclosure of poor corporate management); In re Iowa Freedom of
Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that First Amendment right of ac-
cess applies to civil proceedings for contempt, but portions of proceeding involving trade
secrets were properly closed); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (de-
claring that First Amendment right of access applies to hearings in class actions concerning
prison overcrowding); State v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 542 A.2d 859, 864 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1988) (noting that First Amendment and state constitutional right of access apply
to proceedings and documents in unfair trade practices lawsuit; closure not justified merely
in order to minimize damage to corporate reputation).
80. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 353 (Cal.
1999) [hereinafter KNBC-TV].
81. Id.
82. Id. at 340.
83. Id.
84. Id.
In its analysis of a right of access to civil trials, the California Su-
preme Court held that the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Richmond
Newspaper and its progeny extends beyond criminal trials to encompass
civil trials and proceedings. 85  Furthermore, the court ruled that civil
proceedings are presumptively open and public access serves to "dem-
onstrate that justice is meted out fairly, thereby promoting public confi-
dence in such governmental proceedings," while "provid[ing] a means
.. by which citizens scrutinize and check the use and possible abuse of
judicial power; and ... enhance the truth-finding function of the pro-
ceeding." 86
In similar fashion to the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme
Court believed that the right of access to a civil trial was a qualified
right.87 Although the court held that open access was a presumptive
right, it recognized that closure is permitted, but only in the rarest of cir-
cumstances where a court expressly finds (after notice and an open hear-
ing) that:
(i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure
and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that
the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or seal-
ing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly
tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is
no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding in-
terest.8
8
85. Id. at 361.
86. KNBC-TV, 980 P.2d at 354 (citations omitted); see also Richmond Newspapers Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597 n.22 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court explained:
[T]he availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public presence at the
trial itself. As any experienced appellate judge can attest, the "cold" record is a
very imperfect reproduction of events that transpire in the courtroom. Indeed, to
the extent that publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, "[r]ecordation
.. would be found to operate rather as cloa[k] than chec[k]; as cloa[k] in reality,
as chec[k] only in appearance."
Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 258, 271 (1948)).
87. KNBC-TV, 980 P.2d at 361.
88. Id. at 365; see also Carol Crocca, Annotation, Propriety of Exclusion of Press or
Other Media Representatives from Civil Trial, 39 A.L.R. 5th 103, 128-29 (1996). Crocca
wrote:
The right of the press to attend civil trials under the First Amendment is subject
to exceptions to protect a variety of competing interests in different kinds of pro-
ceedings, and a court has upheld the validity of a statute mandating closed adop-
tion proceedings. The courts have also weighed the right of the press against other
constitutional rights, including that of a fair trial, a state constitutional privacy
right and the right, particularly of a person charged with civil contempt, to the due
process right to a public trial. In the last circumstance, the courts held that the
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PUBLIC ACCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Administrative Proceedings
Throughout the evolution of the right of public access, lower courts
have been much less assertive in extending the right of access to non-
judicial proceedings or documents. Several cases have explicitly held
that the First Amendment right of access does not extend to government
information outside the judicial branch.89 Some courts, though, have
found certain proceedings were required to be open.90 Thus, courts have
differed as to whether the press has a constitutional right of access to
certain administrative proceedings.
right to press access and public trial prevailed except when the alleged contemnor
was not subject to incarceration. Litigants have also sought protection of various
business interests from publicity, and while it was held that the protection of
business reputation did not justify exclusion of the press, trade secrets and other
confidential information, were deemed to justify such protection by the courts.
Personal privacy interests have also been considered by the courts against the
right of the press to attend civil trials, and they have, in the circumstances, some-
times held it proper to exclude the press based on the protection of the parties'
privacy and sometimes not. It has been noted that a party's status as a public fig-
ure does not justify a greater right of privacy, and in fact, if involving a position
of public trust, may militate against closure. As to the privacy of nonparties,
while it has been held that the wishes of witnesses not to testify in public, without
more, did not support an order closing civil proceedings, courts have recognized
that the protection of the privacy of minors, for example, children in a divorce
proceeding, was a legitimate basis for denying access to the press. In cases con-
sidering closure of proceedings to protect medical information concerning a liti-
gant, however, courts have determined that closure was not warranted.
Several matters of public policy or concern have been held to justify the exclu-
sion of the press from civil actions, including the facilitation of settlement, the
physical safety of the public or a trial participant, public morality, and the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings. However, in other cases involving an alleged threat to
the integrity of jury deliberations, to prison discipline, and to the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings, investigations, immunity hearings, and the like, the courts
found the evidence insufficient to support an order excluding the press.
Id.
89. See, e.g., ACLU of Miss. v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1990) (re-
cords of state agency dedicated to maintaining racial segregation); Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d
781, 783 (5th Cir. 1989) (IRS records of Al Capone); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,
797 F.2d 1164, 1172 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (state environmental agency records); Com-
bined Comm. Corp. of Okla. v. Boger, 689 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (NCAA
letter of inquiry to state college); Dean v. Guste, 414 So. 2d 862, 865 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(school board executive session).
90. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (civil service hearing);
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 481 So. 2d 958, 960
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (licensing hearing); Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 455 N.Y.S.2d 413,
415-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (unemployment hearing).
At least one court has used the Richmond Newspaper two-prong stan-
dard to find a right of access outside the judicial branch. In Society of
Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor,91 a federal district court
held that the United States Constitution does not expressly require open
meetings.92 Also, it determined that no common law right of access to
government bodies exist.93 However, the court ruled that the press and
public have a First Amendment right of access to formal administrative
fact-finding hearings. 94 As a result, the press and public had a constitu-
tional right of access to Mine Safety and Health Administration hearings
investigating the cause of a Utah mine fire.
95
Society of Professional Journalists involved a formal fact-finding
hearing by the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") re-
garding a mine disaster.96 The hearing did not involve the adjudication
of the rights of the parties, but was a part of its investigation into the
cause of a coal mine fire.
Although state executive branches are not expressly required by the
Constitution to open their proceedings, the court noted that all fifty
states including the District of Columbia have "Sunshine" statutes re-
quiring some meetings to be open.97 However, their decision to open
the proceedings was based on "the penumbra of the First Amendment
guarantees." 98
The decision to open the MSHA proceedings was also based on the
court's attempt to apply the Richmond Newspapers test according to
how the Supreme Court would rule.99 Examining the same policy con-
siderations as the Supreme Court, the court found little historical tradi-
tion regarding open access to administrative hearings.'°° As a result, the
court decided that civil trials, which have been historically open, were
"analogous to administrative fact-finding proceedings" like the one at
issue. 101
91. 616 F. Supp. 569 (C.D. Utah 1985).
92. Id. at 572.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 573.
95. Id. at 575-76.
96. Id. at 570.
97 Id. at 572.
98. Id. at 573.
99. Id. at 575.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("In ad-
ministrative hearings, the rule of the 'open' forum is prevailing."); see generally 2 KENNETH
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Furthermore, the court examined the broad spectrum of administrative
hearings, rather than the narrow instances of MSHA proceedings. 10 2 In
the end, the court found a tradition that favored openness.
Next, the court examined the procedural importance of openness.
Like the Supreme Court, the court stated: "public awareness and oppor-
tunity to criticize that is the very foundation of our democracy."' 10 3
Thus, "[o]penness safeguards our democratic institutions," 104 while
"[s]ecrecy breeds mistrust and abuse." 105  Furthermore, like the Su-
preme Court, the court found exceptions as to when the right of access
would apply. 106
Importantly, Society of Professional Journalists only applies a right of
access to administrative fact-finding proceedings. 107 Thus, not all hear-
ings are presently open. The Secretary "does not have the unfettered
right to decide whether the hearings conducted by him are public or
not."10 8 An impartial judiciary should determine such a decision. 10 9
Unlike the D.C. Circuit Court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts did not find a First Amendment right of access to licensure pro-
ceedings of employment agencies in WBZ-TV4 v. Executive Office of
Labor.110 The Massachusetts court did not proceed beyond the first-
prong, finding no historical tradition of access.111
The dispute in WBZ-TV4 involved a scheduled hearing on the applica-
tion of Professional Nanny, Inc., for a license to operate an employment
agency.112 Massachusetts' law prohibited "the operation of an employ-
ment agency without a license." 113 Furthermore, the Commissioner of
Labor and Industries did not permit general public access to these hear-
CuLP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14:13 (2d ed. 1978) (stating that hearings of
a somewhat formal character are generally open to the public).
102. Soc'y of Prof I Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575-76.
103. Id. at 576.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 577.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 578.
109. Id.
110. 610 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Mass. 1993).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 924.
113. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 46B (1990) ("Notwithstanding the other provisions
of this chapter no person shall open, keep, maintain, carry on, or advertise any employment
agency unless he has been issued a license ....").
ings. 114 Only applicants and those protesting the application were al-
lowed to attend.1
15
Seeking an injunction to prohibit the Commissioner from excluding
WBZ-TV4, the petitioner argued that Richmond Newspapers and its
precedent permitted a constitutional right of access. 116 However, the
court disagreed and ruled that no historical access to licensing hearings
existed.1 17 Specifically, the court stated: "Nothing has come to our at-
tention that suggests that administrative agency licensing hearings were
'historically... open to the press and general public.., at the time
when our organic laws were adopted."'"118 Thus, the court found no in-
dication that such a proceeding has been opened to the public since the
establishment of United States law. 119 Overall, it is difficult to draw
conclusions regarding the scope of the right of access to administrative
proceedings under the two-prong test. Courts have sent mixed signals
on the test's potential to expand the right of access beyond those already
recognized by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, courts have used the
two-prong test to deny, as well as validate, a right of access to various
administrative hearings. Some courts, like the one in Society of Profes-
sional Journalists, have found that administrative hearings satisfy both
the tradition and contribution function prongs. However, other courts,
like that in WBZ-TV4, have denied such a right, finding a lack of tradi-
tion of public access. 1
20
Statutory Right to Access
Embedded in the principles of democratic government is the principle
of open government. Government processes should be open for public
scrutiny.
Common law does not recognize the right of the public to attend ad-
ministrative and licensure disciplinary proceedings. Likewise, the Su-
preme Court has never held that such a right is guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. However, a right to attend these types of proceedings has been
114. Id. at 924.
115. See id.
116. Id. at925.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)).
119. Id.
120. See also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986) (up-
holding the district court's dismissal of Petitioner's amended complaint because it failed to
allege a traditional right of public access exists).
Public Access to Disciplinary Proceedings 303Fall 2001
304 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
established by open meetings legislation. Today, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have comprehensive open government statutes in
their codes. 121
Similar to the contribution prong of recent Supreme Court right of ac-
cess cases, the rationale behind open meetings legislation is to effec-
tively enable the public to examine government proceedings. This con-
cept supports the basic idea that the right of the public to participate in
democracy includes the right to be informed. Thus, by having statutory
right of access, citizens are able to examine public affairs.
Opponents to open meeting laws argue that public access to govern-
11. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1991 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. §§ 40.25.100-.220,
44.62.310, 44.62.312 (Michie 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-121 to -122 (West 1996
& Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -107 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
6250-6268 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-401 to -402, 24-72-201 to
-309 (1988 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-200-241 (West 1988 & Supp.
1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-05 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1504, 1-1521 to
1-1529 (1992 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.01-.15, 395.3035 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70 to -76 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 92-1, -21, -25,
-29 to -71, 92F-1-92F-42 (1993 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 9-337 to -348, 67-2341
(1997); § 67-2341 (1995 & Supp. 1998); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1-6, 140/1 to 11
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE §§ 5-14-3-1 to -10 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-
.13 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-215 to -225, 75-4317 to -4320a
(1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.805-.850, .870-.991 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.1-.42 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§
401-10 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -628 (1993
& Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 39, §§ 23A-23B; ch. 66, §§ 10-18 (West 1998);
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 15.231-.246 (1994 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.01-.99,
13D.01-.07 (1997 & Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 to -17 (1991 & Supp. 1997);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 109.005-.510 (West 1999), §§ 610.010-.120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-6-101 to -307 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-712-84-712.09
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 239.0005-.330 (Michie 1996); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:l-A:8 (1990 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-6 to -21,
47:1-47:1A-4 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4, 14-2-1 to -3 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1997); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-111 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN
STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1995 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6; N.D. CENT. CODE §§
44-04-18 to -18.2, -18.6 to -18.21 (1993 & Supp. 1997); OHo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 121.21.1,
149.43-.44 (Anderson 1995 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 24A.1-.21 (West
1988 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-.530 (1991 & Supp. 1996); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 38-2-1 to -14 (1997);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Law Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§§ 1-27-1 to -19 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-44-101 to -108, 10-7-
503 to -508 (1997); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 551-001-552.353 (Vernon 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-1 to -10, 63-2-201 to -207 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 315-20
(1996 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.250-.348, 42.30.010-.920 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); W.
VA. CODE §§ 29B-1-1 to -7 (1993 & Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.31-.39 (West 1996
& Supp. 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-201 to -205 (Michie 1997).
ment proceedings is a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 122 This
argument is based upon the belief that First Amendment freedoms of
speech and press have as their underlying principle, the prevention of
governmental interference with the communication of the facts of gov-
ernmental proceedings.
123
Proponents of open meeting law argue oppositely that the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee public access. Such an argument is based upon
the Ninth Amendment, which reserves to the people rights not enumer-
ated elsewhere in the Constitution. 
124
Overall, open meeting laws grant a statutory right to government pro-
ceedings in the absence of a common law or First Amendment right.
However, although a statutory right of access may exist, closure may
occur. The decision of a court to restrict a statutory right of access is
based on compelling reasons, balancing of interests, or "good caust. I25
These factors are crucial to physician and attorney disciplinary hearings
where no first amendment right of access exists.
122. See generally Christopher W. Deering, Closing the Door on the Public Right to
Know: Alabama's Open Meetings Law after Dunn v. Alabama State University Board of
Trustees, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 361 (1997-1998).
123. See id. at 371 n.46. Justice Black, as a strong proponent of the First Amendment,
stated:
I view the guarantees of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our
governmental structure rests and without which it could not continue to endure as
conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as
important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact,
this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result
is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.
Id. (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02
(1941) (Black, J., dissenting). But see David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the
Public's "Right to Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 587 (1980) (arguing that the First
Amendment is an insufficient basis for a right to know claim).
124. Deering, supra note 122, at 372 nn.50-51; see also id. at 372 n.51 (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)). Justice Harlan set forth a "ra-
tional continuum" approach to the Ninth Amendment's scope:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere pro-
vided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints...
and which also recognizes.., that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.
Id.
125. See generally Deering, supra note 122.
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ACCESS TO PHYSICIAN AND ATrORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Physician Disciplinary Proceedings
Like administrative proceedings, physician disciplinary proceedings
are agency hearings regulated by the state government. Two courts have
examined whether a constitutional right of access to disciplinary pro-
ceedings exists. 126
The court in both decisions concluded that there is no First Amend-
ment right of access inasmuch as there is "no historical basis for open
professional disciplinary hearings" and no showing that "the public
played a significant role in the licensing or policing of professionals." 127
In Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino,128 the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York upheld a lower court's denial of an or-
der compelling public access to a disciplinary hearing involving a dentist
charged with unprofessional conduct. 129 The Johnson Newspaper court
affirmed the lower court's decision and dismissed the petitioner's argu-
ment that there is a constitutionally-based public right of access to pro-
fessional disciplinary hearing. 130 The court instead applied what it de-
scribed as the Supreme Court's two-tiered test.131 The test "includes
'whether the place and process have historically been open to the press
and general public' and 'whether public access plays a significant posi-
tive role in the functioning of the particular process in question."' 132
Noting Press II, the court found no historical basis for open professional
disciplinary hearings. 133 Additionally, there was "no showing that pub-
lic access plays 'a significant role' in the functioning of the proceed-
ings."' 134 As a result, the court found no presumptive right of access.
In a later case, Dr. J.P. v. Chassin,135 the Appellate Division of the
126. Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 547 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (holding that disciplinary proceeding involving a license to practice dentistry is confi-
dential); Dr. J.P. v. Chassin, 594 N.Y.S.2d 930, 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that dis-
ciplinary proceeding involving a license to practice medicine is confidential).
127. Johnson Newspaper, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16; Chassin, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
128. Johnson Newspaper, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
129. Id. at 917.
130. Id. at915-16.
131. Id. at 916.
132. Id. at 916.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Press 11, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
135. Chassin, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
21-2
Supreme Court of New York again held that no First Amendment right
of public access exists in physician disciplinary proceedings. 136 Chassin
involved a physician who sought to enjoin the State Board of Profes-
sional Medical Conduct from disclosing information with respect to the
proceedings until they were finally determined. 137 The basis of this con-
tention was that New York state law mandated that professional disci-
plinary proceedings remain confidential until a final determination is
rendered. 138
Although the respondents raised no First Amendment right of public
access, the court upheld Johnson Newspaper, ruling that:
The right to public access to a professional disciplinary
proceeding depends upon "whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general pub-
lic" and "whether public access plays a significant posi-
tive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question." 139
Furthermore, the court stated that:
It has been the traditional policy of this State to maintain
confidentiality in professional misconduct proceedings
until final determination. That policy of confidentiality
serves the public purpose of removing any disincentive
to the filing of professional misconduct complaints by
protecting any private or confidential information that a
complainant would not want publicly disclosed.
140
Therefore, by strictly applying the two-prong test of Press II the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed, and up-
held that no First Amendment right of public access exists in profes-
sional disciplinary proceedings. 141
Physician Disciplinary Proceedings and Open Meeting Laws
Although no court has concluded that a Constitutional right of public
access exists in physician disciplinary proceedings, state open meeting
136. Id. at 934.
137. Id. at 931,935.
138. Id. at 933-35.
139. Id. at 935.
140. Id.
141. Johnson Newspaper, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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laws have provided another means of public access. As stated above,
state open meeting laws provide a statutory right to proceedings where
presumptive or Constitutional rights do not exist. In addition, states
have created a statutory right of access governing medical boards.142
These statutes, which provide a right of access to medical disciplinary
hearings, provide exemptions which support closure. One such exemp-
tion is physician reputation. The justification for such closure is the
need to protect the reputation of a physician from damage that may re-
sult from an airing of unsubstantial charges. Also, physician discipli-
nary proceedings are closed in order to protect the confidentiality rights
of the physician-patient relationship. In some instances these laws con-
flict with general open meeting laws. 143 A decision as to which law ap-
plies varies by state. 144
Overall, most courts recognize the rights granted by the organic stat-
ute of medical boards rather than the state's general open meeting laws.
As a result, most physicians' disciplinary hearings are closed until "good
cause" is determined, thus protecting patient confidentiality. This pro-
cedure demonstrates a boards' sensitivity toward patient protection and
the possibility of irreparable harm to a physician's reputation resulting
from unfounded accusations.
Additionally, some courts determine a right of access using the
142. Joseph D. Steinfield & Robert A. Bertsche, Current Developments in the Law of
Access, 371 PLI/Pat 7, 54 (1993). According to a 1992 report by the Federation of State
Medical Boards, Montana appears to be the only state that allows public access to patient
complaints against licensed medical doctors prior to investigative action. However, signifi-
cant majorities of State Medical Boards allow public access to formal disciplinary proceed-
ings, once good cause has been determined in the initial complaint. Oregon does not allow
public access to any part of its physician disciplinary proceeding. Spray v. Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 627 P.2d 25, 25 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
143. Chassin, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
144. See Appeal of Plantier, 494 A.2d 270, 275-76 (N.H. 1985) (nuling that a general
right-to-know law, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 91-A:3, 11(c) (Supp. 1998), that was generally ap-
plicable to any functions affecting citizens by boards or commissioners of state agencies,
allowing them to meet in executive session in matters which might adversely affect the repu-
tation of any person, was not applicable to a medical disciplinary proceeding, when a doctor
requested an open hearing under [N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17, X (Supp. 1998)], which
provided that hearings would be closed unless the physician requested an open hearing.). As
a result, an open meetings law, which provided closure during deliberations, was not appli-
cable and the hearing was open since the physician had not requested a closed hearing. Id. at
276; see also Spray v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 627 P.2d 25, 25 (1981) (holding that the
Oregon open meetings law did not apply to deliberations of the board of medical examiners'
meeting to decide licensure revocation.). The court determined that OR. REV. STAT. 192.690
(1999) provided that open meetings law should not apply to deliberations of state agencies
conducting hearings on contested cases. Id.
Mathews due process balancing test. 145  A license to practice law or
medicine is considered a property right by the courts, and like other
forms of property, the possessor cannot be deprived of property rights
without due process. 146 As a result, rather than utilize the two-prong
test, courts may apply a balancing test in order to determine public ac-
cess under open meeting laws. 147
In conclusion, no court has found a First Amendment right of access
to physician disciplinary proceedings for either the public, or the press.
However, states vary in the procedures used to contemplate such hear-
ings. Some states have created a statutory right of access. However,
these statutes have exemptions designed to protect the physician, the in-
dividual, and government interests.
Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
Attorney disciplinary proceedings vary greatly from state to state. No
court has found a First Amendment right of access to attorney discipli-
nary proceedings for the public or the press. 148 However, rules govern-
ing attorney disciplinary proceedings permit access in some states.
145. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (balancing private interest, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and government interests).
146. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) ("The hallmark of
property... is an.. individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed
except 'for cause."'); see also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957)
(holding that a "[s]tate cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner... that contravene the Due process .... ).
147. Obasi v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 639 N.E.2d 1318, 1326 (Ill. 1994) (holding
that since the hearing was not impeded due to the presence of cameras, due process rights
were not violated).
148. But c.f. Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F. Supp. 981, 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(holding that the state bar rule requiring complete confidentiality in the attorney discipline
process violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by requiring those
who file grievances against lawyers to remain quiet). The court opined that the interests of
the state bar in encouraging the filing of complaints and the cooperation of witnesses, pro-
tecting individual attorneys' reputations, upholding the bar's integrity, and making the disci-
plinary process easier, did not sufficiently outweigh the public's fight to publicly discuss the
character and competence of an attorney. Id. at 986. The Doe court held that the Florida Bar
rule prohibiting complainants from disclosing information involving disciplinary proceed-
ings was not a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Id. The court reasoned
that the rule was specifically aimed at the content of the speech and constituted an "absolute
bar, which provided no alternative avenues of expression." Id. at 985. The court held that
the Florida Bar rule was not "narrowly tailored to meet the specific interest it is said to serve.
Rather, it broadly stifles speech when the ends it purports to achieve can be met by more nar-
row means." Id. at 988.
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Unlike physician disciplinary hearings, many State Bar Associations
continue to close their disciplinary proceedings to the public. In 1992, a
report of the National State Bar Association reported twenty-eight states
allowed public access; however, access is only allowed after the disci-
plinary board finds probable cause to believe misconduct occurred.
149
Other states allow public access only after a final judgment is made pub-
lic. 150 Oregon allows public access from the initial filing of the com-
plaint, whereas West Virginia and Florida permit access to initial com-
plaints once probable cause is found. 151 In Virginia most proceedings
are closed leaving only a small number of hearings open.
152
The justification offered for the secrecy of disciplinary proceedings is
the need to protect the reputation of attorneys from irreparable harm that
may result from an airing of unsubstantial charges. 153 However, public
criticism of legal disciplinary proceedings and an effort to reduce the
appearance of impropriety has fostered efforts to open attorney discipli-
nary proceedings to the public.
Due to the public perception of mistrust, state bar associations as well
as the American Bar Association have supported the controversial rec-
ommendation to open disciplinary proceedings. 154 One recommenda-
tion suggested opening disciplinary proceedings fully to public scrutiny.
This recommendation of the American Bar Association's Commission
of Disciplinary Enforcement, the "McKay Commission," would open
149. Steinfield & Bertsche, supra note 142, at 53 (including Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin).
150. Id. (including Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Contra Don J. DeBenedictis, Advice is Legal, 77 A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (1991) ("Yet, in
Oregon, which has had an entirely open system for fifteen years, there has been no evidence
that public disclosure has harmed the reputation of any of the state's 18,000 attorneys.").
154. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT MCKAY RECOMMENDATION 7 (1992) ("McKay Commission"). The McKay
Commission is convinced that secrecy in discipline proceedings continues to be the greatest
single source of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems. Because it engenders such
distrust, secrecy does great harm to the reputation of the profession. The public's expectation
of government and especially of judicial proceedings is that they will be open to the public,
on the public record, and that the public and media will be able to freely comment on the
proceedings. Id.; see also N.J. BAR ASS'N, MICHELS COMM'N REPORT (1993); ILL. BAR
ASS'N, ILL ATT'Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE COMM'N REPORT (1997).
attorney disciplinary proceedings to the public from the time of filing of
a formal complaint to the delivery of notice to the accused attorney. 
155
Like physician disciplinary proceedings, most rules governing pro-
ceedings provide a statutory right of access dependent upon a finding of
good cause. This limitation balances protecting an attorney's reputation,
stock, and trade with the importance of informing the public of a com-
plaint against an attorney. Even if a statutory right of access exists, the
right protects an attorney against frivolous complaints while also serving
the public.
Right of Access and State Constitutions
In Oregon and West Virginia, the state constitutions provide a right of
access to disciplinary hearings. 156 West Virginia and Oregon both have
extended the guarantees of public access beyond those that the United
States Supreme Court has recognized under the First Amendment. 157 In
doing so, Oregon and West Virginia have relied exclusively on analysis
of the state open court provision found in their respective state constitu-
tions. 158 As a result, West Virginia has treated recognized federal rights
to public access as only a minimum guarantee, while Oregon courts hold
that public access is not a qualified right, but an absolute right. 1
59
West Virginia
After Richmond Newspaper and before Press II, the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that a right of public access to pretrial hearings in
criminal proceedings was guaranteed under the state's open courts pro-
vision. 160 In its analysis, the court examined whether relevant state con-
stitutional protections exceeded those provided by the Federal Constitu-
155. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT McKAY RECOMMENDATION 7 (1992).
156. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17 ("The courts of this state shall be open..."); OR.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating "No court shall be secret .... ").
157. See, e.g., Daily Gazette 11, 352 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that state consti-
tutional open court provision required that disciplinary proceedings of state medical board
should be open); State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 P.2d 173 (Or. 1987)
(holding that public access to judicial proceedings was an absolute right).
158. W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("The courts of this state shall be open..."); OR.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating "No court shall be secret .... ").
159. Jack B. Harrison, How Open is Open? The Development of the Public Access
Doctrine Under State Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CtN. L. REv. 1307, 1329-30 (1992)
(discussing the constitutional issue of public access to judicial proceedings).
160. State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 (W. Va. 1980).
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tion.161 Because West Virginia's open courts provision did not, the
court's ruling developed an independent state constitutional doctrine al-
lowing for open court proceedings. This right was later extended to at-
torney and physician disciplinary proceedings. 162
In Daily Gazette Co. v. Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Vir-
ginia State Bar, 16 3 the West Virginia Supreme Court heard a challenge
to a state statute that closed the disciplinary proceedings of the state bar
ethics committee to the public. 164 The petitioners brought a mandamus
action to compel the Committee on Legal Ethics to release information
concerning its investigation of an attorney's disciplinary proceeding. 165
Although the mandamus action was made moot when the attorney
agreed to release information regarding the proceeding, the court pro-
vided a brief discussion on the issue of public access. 166 The court fo-
cused on petitioner's inquiry whether the open courts provision of the
state constitution guaranteed a right of public access to adjudicatory pro-
ceedings outside the direct scope of the legal system. 167 The court in-
cluded state bar proceedings as a part of the legal system because the
unique nature of attorney disciplinary proceedings does not exempt them
from the requirements of the West Virginia Constitution art. 1I, § 17.168
According to the court, the primary function of attorney disciplinary
proceedings was to protect the public's interest. 169 Therefore, a compel-
ling need for openness existed. 170 Thus, the court extended the qualified
right of public access under the state's open courts provision to attorney
disciplinary proceedings. 171 As a result, this right of access under the
West Virginia Constitution was extended beyond formal trials to other
161. Id.
162. See Daily Gazette 1, 326 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1984); Daily Gazette 11, 352 S.E.2d
66, 70-72 (W. Va. 1986).
163. 326 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1984).
164. Id. at 709. Article VI § 30 of the West Virginia State Bar By-Laws states:
All proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by or the disability of an at-
torney shall be kept confidential until and unless a recommendation for the impo-
sition of public discipline is filed with the court by the committee on legal ethics,
or the respondent attorney requests that the matter be public, or the investigation
is predicated upon a conviction of the respondent attorney for a crime.
165. Id. at 706-07.
166. Id. at 707-09.
167. Id. at 709-11.
168. Id. at 711.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
types of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. 172 However, this right
was extended in attorney disciplinary proceedings only after there was a
finding of probable cause. 173
Two years later, the court further extended this right of access to
quasi-judicial proceedings under the state's open court provision when it
held that the disciplinary proceedings of the State Board of Medicine
were likewise to be open. 174 In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia affirmed a lower court's order enjoining the Board of
Medicine from closing disciplinary proceedings. 175 The court deter-
mined that relevant parts of the West Virginia Medical Practice Act
176
were unconstitutional. 177  Like attorney disciplinary proceedings, the
court held that if the Board of Medicine makes a preliminary determina-
tion that probable cause exists, the proceedings shall be public. 178 Over-
all, the right of public access to professional disciplinary proceedings in
West Virginia is a qualified right dependent upon a finding of probable
cause. 179
Oregon 180
Unlike the West Virginia courts, which ruled that its state's open
courts provision provides a qualified right of public access, the Oregon
court articulated an absolute right of public access to judicial proceed-
ings. 18 1 While the court concluded that the open courts provision might
not apply to some traditionally closed proceedings, the court made clear
that tradition would not be determinative of the issue of openness.
182
Thus, the Oregon court developed a state constitutional doctrine inde-
172. Id. at 710.
173. Id. at 712-13.
174. Daily Gazette I1, 352 S.E.2d at 70-72.
175. Id. at 71-72.
176. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-6 (1980).
177. Daily Gazette 11, 352 S.E.2d at 70-71 (providing in part: "Meetings of the board
shall be held in public session, except that ... disciplinary proceedings shall be held in
closed sessions, unless the party subject to discipline requests that the hearing be held in
public session.").
178. Id. at 70.
179. See id. at 70-71.
180. See generally Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, (1970).
181. State ex rel. Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. O'Leary, 736 P.2d 173, 176 (Or. 1987).
182. Id. at 177. Proceedings that might be exempted are those, which were tradition-
ally closed before the adoption of the Oregon Constitution, such as jury deliberations and
collegial court conferences. Id.
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pendent of the federal doctrine of public access. Accordingly, it is un-
clear why Oregon is the only state that completely closes its physician
disciplinary hearings, but provides complete public access to the same
proceedings for attorneys. Nevertheless, no Oregon or federal court has
addressed this parity in public access.
CONCLUSIONS
Providing public access to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is a
valuable means of protecting the public. Although no First Amendment
right of access exists, the rules governing state attorney and physician
disciplinary proceedings create a right of access. This legal right in
some states reflects traditional constitutional analysis and balances pro-
fessional interest with public interest.
With the exception of a few states, most formal hearings are open to
the public. These proceedings are "trial-like" and similar to civil and
criminal proceedings, which have a tradition of open access. Opening
formal disciplinary hearings once good cause is determined, weighs im-
portantly on the process. Conditioning access upon establishing good
cause protects the public interest without harming a professional's repu-
tation. Additionally, determining good cause before opening a hearing
protects a citizen's confidentiality rights as either a patient or client. Fi-
nally, not opening disciplinary proceedings to the public until good
cause is established, compliments the constitutional threshold that "[t]he
presumption [of openness] may be overcome only by an overriding in-
terest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher val-
ues."
183
183. Press 11, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (quoting Press 1, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
